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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adam considers himself a connoisseur of music. Recently, 
Adam’s favorite album store closed, and finding his loyalty to disc 
albums lost, he decides to purchase digital songs from iTunes. In a short 
amount of time, Adam builds a collection of ten thousand songs. Then, 
the birth of his daughter, Bailey, gives Adam a sense of his legacy. So, 
Adam executes a will that includes a gift of his iTunes collection to 
Bailey, hoping that she may enjoy his music someday. As fate would 
have it, Adam dies shortly after executing his will. The executor of 
Adam’s estate attempts to access his iTunes account only to find that 
Apple has terminated it, citing its terms and conditions that grants 
purchasers only a non-transferable license in the music.1 Like many 
individuals, Adam was unaware of his limited rights to his iTunes 
account.2 Because Apple is within its rights to terminate Adam’s music 
1 See, e.g., Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, 
http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2016) (“Licensor grants to you a nontransferable license to use 
the Licensed Application on any Apple-branded products that you own or 
control and as permitted by the Usage Rules.”); World of Warcraft Terms of Use, 
BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company 
/legal/wow_tou. html (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (“Blizzard does not recognize 
the transfer of World of Warcraft Accounts . . .. You may not purchase, sell, 
gift or trade any Account, or offer to purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, 
and any such attempt shall be null and void. Blizzard owns, has licensed, or 
otherwise has rights to all of the content that appears in the Game.”).  
2 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, STUDY ON CONSUMERS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS (T&CS) 10 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ 
consumer_evidence/behavioural_research/docs/terms_and_conditions_final_r
eport_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). Interestingly, PayPal’s term of service 
agreement has a higher word count (36,275) than Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
(30,066), and the iTunes term of service agreement has a higher word count 
(19,972) than Macbeth (18,110). Id. at 14. 
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upon his death, Bailey will not receive any of her father’s music 
collection.3  
An average person in the United States values his or her digital 
assets at $55,000,4 but as illustrated above, there are questions of how 
many digital assets an individual actually owns.5 To determine ownership 
rights in digital assets, consumers must read their terms of service 
(“TOS”) agreements, which are most notable for: “By clicking [here], 
you agree to our Terms. . . .”6  Most consumers will find that they have a 
non-transferable license agreement with the online service provider (e.g., 
Facebook, Apple, etc.), and that what they think they “own” cannot be 
traded, sold, gifted, or transferred by will.7  
In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) addressed the 
practical concern regarding executors, trustees, administrators, or 
conservators accessing a deceased individual’s email, online bank 
account, or even Facebook account by issuing the Revised Uniform 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (the “RUFADAA”).8 Generally, 
3 See generally Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359 (E.D. N.Y. 2015); i.Lan 
Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 
2002).    
4 EVERPLANS, https://www.everplans.com/articles/the-value-of-digital-assets-
and-how-to-keep-track-of-them-all (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). In a 2011 study, 
McAfee estimated that worldwide, an average individual owns approximately 
$37,000 in digital assets. Id.  
5 See David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 543, 567 (2014). 
6 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/?stype=lo&jlou=AfdfJWewvMR2l-
T8j9vCqbp62cYcKemKBumaIxmv8dwG4L0KcRNN968pYFTdlHAw3H8lG
NSYERSZm6P5-DgLxKF-&smuh=43332&lh=Ac-BPE-1-DLTRhJl (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2016); see, e.g., Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, supra 
note 1. (“To confirm your understanding and acceptance of the Agreement, 
click ‘Agree.’”).  
7 See, e.g., Olivia Y. Truong, Virtual Inheritance: Assigning More Virtual Property 
Rights, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 57, 73-74 (2009) (detailing the TOS 
agreement granting a license to use a virtual gaming world).  
8 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT prefatory 
note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2015_RUFADAA_Fin
al%20Act_2016mar8.pdf. 
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the RUFADAA authorizes personal representatives of decedents’ estates 
to access digital assets as though they were tangible assets9 so that 
executors may accurately conduct inventory, accounting, and pay debts.10 
In doing so, the ULC addressed the growing criminal and civil liability 
concerns arising out of federal privacy law for personal representatives 
accessing a decedent’s online account.11 For instance, a personal 
representative may have exposed him- or herself to criminal liability for 
using a password of the decedent, who is oftentimes a family member, to 
login to the decedent’s email account.12  
While access to decedents’ digital assets is important, the 
RUFADAA fails to address a more complex and significant issue:13 the 
transfer of digital assets at death.14 Inheritability addresses whether an 
individual can transfer an asset at death by will, contract, or intestacy.15 
9 Id. (stating that the act allows fiduciaries to have the “legal authority to 
manage digital assets and electronic communications in the same way they 
manage tangible assets and financial accounts . . . [.]”). 
10 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (1932) (presenting inventory to the 
court); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-404 (2007) (providing that executors may pay 
debts out of real property of the estate once personal property is exhausted).  
11 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (West 2008) (providing that an individual may 
not access the online account of another individual without authorization); see 
also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2002) (providing a fine and imprisonment for 
unauthorized access to an electronic communication). See generally David 
Horton, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1729 
(2014).  
12 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c) (West 2008) (imposing criminal sentences and 
fines).  
13 UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL MEETING ISSUES MEMO 2 (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Di
gital%20Assets/2014am_ufadaa_issues%20memo.pdf (“It governs only access 
to digital assets. It defers to other law to determine the ownership of the 
assets.”); see UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL MEETING ISSUES MEMO 2 
(2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to 
%20Digital%20Assets/2013AM_FADA_IssuesMemo.pdf.  
14 See Horton, supra note 5, at 567; Anthony C. Eichler, “Owning” What You 
“Buy”: How iTunes Uses Federal Copyright Law to Limit Inheritability of Content, and the 
Need to Expand the First Sale Doctrine to Include Digital Assets, 16 HOUS. BUS. & 
TAX L.J. 208, 226–28 (2016).   
15 See Eichler, supra note 14, at 213.  
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Online service providers, however, prevent the inheritability of digital 
assets by only granting consumers a non-transferable license in the 
product.16 Thus, state legislatures should encourage online service 
providers and consumers to use private agreements to dispose of digital 
assets at death; otherwise, states should promote consumer protection 
over the enforceability of TOS agreements by allowing consumers to 
transfer digital property via will.17 After all, allowing consumers to 
dispose of digital assets at death would protect consumers by granting 
them an ownership right typically associated with traditional assets, 
which would otherwise be obviated by lengthy contracts of adhesion that 
are rarely read.18  
Part II of this paper analyzes the development of the 
RUFADAA and the issues of access versus inheritability.19 Part III 
summarizes the literature on the right to transfer at death and the law of 
wills overriding contracts.20 Following the general background of the 
relationship between wills and contracts, Part IV explores the definition 
of, and rights in, digital assets and, specifically, the enforceability of TOS 
agreements.21 Lastly, Part V proposes that state legislatures should adopt 
the three-tier system of the RUFADAA for the purpose of 
inheritability.22 Specifically, Part V proposes that an individual may 
designate a beneficiary of a digital asset by private agreement with the 
online service provider which is separate from a standard TOS 
16 Kristina Sherry, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate 
Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 
204 (2012).  
17 See Horton, supra note 5, at 547; see also infra Part V, section A and 
accompanying notes. 
18 See infra Part V, section A and accompanying notes.  
19 See infra Part II.  
20 See infra Part III.  
21 See infra Part IV.  
22 See infra Part V.  
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agreement; otherwise, individuals may designate a beneficiary by will, 
overriding any contrary provision in a standard TOS agreement.23  
II. THE RUFADAA: ISSUES OF ACCESS AND INHERITABILITY 
For estate planning, accessibility24 and inheritability25 are the 
most significant issues regarding digital asset ownership. As 
demonstrated in this section, the RUFADAA resolves many of the issues 
of accessibility, but it does not address the more important issue of 
inheritability.26 
A. The Development of the RUFADAA 
In 2013, the ULC’s Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets 
Committee outlined the potential issues regarding fiduciary (e.g., 
executor, personal representative) authority to access digital assets.27 The 
most relevant issues for fiduciary access were: (1) privacy for decedents 
and (2) preventing liability for personal representatives when they access 
a decedent’s online account.28 Specifically, without state law providing 
authority for a fiduciary to access online accounts,  a fiduciary may need 
a court order to gain access.29 Furthermore, if a fiduciary accessed a 
decedent’s digital account without authorization, the fiduciary may be 
subject to criminal and civil liability under the Stored Communications 
23 See infra Part V. 
24 See 2013 ISSUES MEMO, supra note 13, at 1–3 
25 See generally Horton, supra note 5.  
26 Eichler, supra note 14, at 225–26.  
27 See 2013 ISSUES MEMO, supra note 13, at 1–3.  
28 See id.  
29 See Horton, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, supra note 11, at 
1732.  
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Act,30 the Electronic Computer Privacy Act,31 and the Consumer Fraud 
and Abuse Act.32 
Accordingly, in 2014, the ULC issued the Uniform Fiduciary 
Access to Digital Assets Act (UFADAA), which proposed to give 
personal representatives implicit authority to access a decedent’s online 
accounts.33  In other words, the UFADAA presumed that the decedent 
would have wanted the personal representative to access and manage his 
or her online accounts.34 Naturally, online service providers feared that 
this presumption of authorization would undermine a decedent’s privacy 
after death because the decedent does not have to authorize the access 
of electronic communications (e.g., emails, social media accounts, etc.).35 
In 2015, the ULC reacted to online service providers’ opposition 
to the UFADAA by issuing the RUFADAA.36 In a compromise, the 
ULC drafted the RUFADAA to provide that if users consented to 
disclosure of electronic communications, then the online service 
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2002) (providing a fine and imprisonment for 
unauthorized access to an electronic communication).  
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (West 2002) (allowing civil damages against an interceptor 
of electronic communications).  
32 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)–(c) (West 2008) (imposing criminal sentences and 
fines for unauthorized access to digital account of another). 
33 See UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2014), http://www. 
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Asse
ts/UFADAA%202014%20Post-approval%20Pre-style.pdf. 
34 See id. 
35 See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL MEETING ISSUES MEMO 1 (2015), 
http://www.uniformlaws. 
org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/UFADAA
_Explanation%20of%20proposed%20amendments_2015AM.pdf (“The 2015 
bills were blocked by a coalition of internet-based businesses and privacy 
advocates that opposed certain provisions of UFADAA[.]”). 
36 See id.  
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provider would disclose that information to a personal representative.37 
Without this consent of the decedent, personal representatives can only 
receive a catalogue of the electronic communications of a deceased 
user.38  As a result of this compromise, twenty states have enacted the 
RUFADAA,39 and another twelve states have introduced it.40  
B. The Three Tier System under the RUFADAA 
The RUFADAA created a three-tier system for a decedent to 
authorize an executor to access his or her online accounts.41 Specifically, 
a decedent may authorize a fiduciary to access the online accounts via an 
online tool agreement, which overrides any will or TOS agreement. 
Otherwise, a decedent may authorize an executor to access the accounts 
under a will, thereby overriding a TOS agreement.42 Absent 
authorization by an online tool agreement or will, the TOS agreement 
controls access to the online account.43  
The language of the three-tier system is as follows:  
(a) A user may use an online tool to direct 
the custodian to disclose to a designated 
37 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 7 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary 
%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2015_RUFADAA_Final%20Act_201
6mar8.pdf. 
38 Id. at § 8.  
39 Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised (2015), UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20D
igital%20Assets%20Act,%20Revised%20(2015) (last visited Dec. 12, 2016). The 
following states have enacted the RUFADAA: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Id.  
40 Id. The following states have introduced the RUFADAA: Alabama, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia. Id.  
41 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4(a)–(c); 
see also infra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.  
42 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4(a)–(b).  
43 See id. at § 4(c).  
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recipient or not to disclose some or all of 
the user’s digital assets, . . . . [A] direction 
regarding disclosure using an online tool 
overrides a contrary direction by the user in 
a will, trust, power of attorney, or other 
dispositive or nominative instrument. 
(b) If a user has not used an online tool to 
give direction under subsection (a) or if 
the custodian has not provided an online 
tool, the user may allow or prohibit in a 
will, trust, power of attorney, or other 
record, disclosure to a fiduciary of some 
or all of the user’s digital assets, including 
the content of electronic communications 
sent or received by the user. 
(c) A user’s direction under subsection (a) 
or (b) overrides a contrary provision in a 
terms-of-service agreement that does not 
require the user to act affirmatively and 
distinctly from the user's assent to the 
terms of service.44 
Under the RUFADAA, an online tool is “an electronic service provided 
by a custodian that allows the user, in an agreement distinct from the 
terms-of-service agreement between the custodian and user, to provide 
directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital assets to a third 
person[.]”45 Thus, a TOS agreement is distinct from an online tool 
agreement under the RUFADAA because an online tool only controls 
the designation of an individual that may access a person’s account at 
death, unlike a TOS agreement which “controls the relationship between 
a user and a custodian.”46 For example, Facebook, a social media 
44 Id. at § 4(a)–(c); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-51-104 (2016). 
45 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 2(16). 
46 Id. at § 2(24).  
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platform, provides a legacy contact agreement (i.e., an online tool) that 
allows a user to designate an individual to manage the user’s account 
upon his or her death.47 
C. Accessibility Under the RUFADAA Does Not Go Far Enough 
With the RUFADAA, the ULC responded to the privacy and 
liability concerns of personal representatives accessing the online 
accounts of deceased individuals.48 However, if a TOS agreement 
provides that a user owns no interest in the account upon death, then the 
personal representative can access the account but cannot retrieve any 
value from that account.49 Simply put, the significance of accessing a 
decedent’s online account is severely diminished if there is no value in 
that account.  
For example, if Adam transfers $200,000 of cash to Bailey under 
his will, but this cash is in Adam’s online bank account, Adam’s executor 
can access this account when acting under the authority of Adam’s will.50 
However, if Adam designates that Bailey will receive his iTunes account, 
Apple may prevent Bailey from using the songs on her father’s account 
because the TOS agreement provides that the music is non-
transferable.51 Evidently, the RUFADAA alleviated many issues with 
access, but this paper focuses on the more pertinent issue: the 
inheritability of digital assets.  
47 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=security&section= 
memorialization&view (last visited on Mar. 5, 2017).  
48 See 2015 ISSUES MEMO, supra note 35, at 1–2 (“The 2015 bills were blocked 
by a coalition of internet-based businesses and privacy advocates that opposed 
certain provisions of UFADAA[.]”).  
49 See 2014 ISSUES MEMO, supra note 13, at 2 (providing that fiduciaries ‘step 
into the shoes of’ decedent).  
50 See Gerry M. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 
NAELA J. 135, 141 (2013).  
51 See 2014 ISSUES MEMO, supra note 13, at 2 (“[RUFADAA] governs only 
access to digital assets. It 
defers to other law to determine the ownership of the assets.”).  
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D. Inheritability: Expansion of the First Sale Doctrine under Federal Copyright 
Law 
Only one commentator has argued that the RUFADAA is 
insufficient because it does not address the issue of inheritability.52 
Specifically, Anthony Eichler argued that the first sale doctrine under 
copyright law must apply to digital assets because federal copyright law 
preempts any meaningful reform under state law.53 Generally, the first 
sale doctrine provides that “the right of producer to control distribution 
of its [copyrighted] product does not extend beyond the first sale of the 
product.”54 In other words, once the copyright owner sells the 
copyrighted item, the copyright owner cannot also limit the resale of that 
item.55 Consequently, the transfer of a digital asset at death would not 
result in copyright infringement.56  
Eichler relied on the recent case of Capitol Records v. ReDigi to 
establish that digital assets are not subject to the first sale doctrine.57 
ReDigi involved a record company bringing a copyright infringement 
claim against an online marketplace that bought and sold used, digital 
music.58 In ReDigi, the court held that the online marketplace violated the 
Copyright Act because “the first sale defense is limited to material items, 
like records, that the copyright owner put into the stream of 
52 Eichler, supra note 14, at 225–26. 
53 Id. at 226–28; see also Elizabeth Horan, Die Hard (And Pass On Your Digital 
Media): How the Pieces Have Come Together to Revolutionize Copyright Law for the 
Digital Era, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1829, 1863 (2014) (stating that “[a]n 
amendment must explicitly state that the protections of the First Sale Doctrine 
apply to digital and downloaded works when those works are able to be 
transmitted in a way that does not produce copies.”).  
54 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008). 
55 See id.; Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654–55 
(S.D. N.Y. 2013).  
56 See Eichler, supra note 14, at 228–31. 
57 See id. at 223.  
58 ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645–46.  
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commerce.”59 The court reasoned that to sell a used mp3 song entails 
producing a new file (i.e., a recopy) on a different server, and thus, it is 
impossible to resell this particular digital asset without infringement.60 As 
Eichler has illustrated, the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital 
assets.61 If this doctrine is expanded and TOS agreements are deemed 
unconscionable, Eichler concluded that decedents may transfer their 
digital assets at death.62  
However, Eichler dismissed state law reform too quickly because 
state law governs the contractual rights of TOS agreements.63 For 
example, if the first sale doctrine applied to Adam’s iTunes account but 
no state law prioritized Adam’s will over Apple’s TOS agreement, then 
Apple could still deny Bailey’s use of her father’s iTunes music under the 
authority of the TOS even though Apple would not have grounds under 
copyright law.64 Consequently, state law and federal copyright reform are 
both necessary to protect consumers in an increasingly digital age.65  
Unlike Eichler, this paper focuses on the reforms that state 
legislatures could implement to allow inheritability of digital assets and 
protection of consumers. To begin a discussion of state law allowing 
inheritability of digital assets, it is necessary to explore the pertinent legal 
doctrines implicated under state law: the right to transfer property at 
death and the right to contract.  
III. THE RIGHT TO TRANSFER PROPERTY AT DEATH 
Generally, two of the most significant and respected aspects of 
American law are the right to dispose of property at death66 and the right 
59 Id. at 655.  
60 Id. 
61 Eichler, supra note 14, at 223. 
62 Id. at 230–31. 
63 See Sherry, supra note 16, at 204.  
64 Contra Eichler, supra note 14, at 223–28.  
65 See id.  
66 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
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to contract.67 However, these two principles conflict when evaluating the 
inheritability of digital assets given that TOS agreements generally 
provide that digital assets cannot be transferred at death.68 Resolving this 
conflict requires examining the development of the right to transfer at 
death and the traditional circumstances under which wills can override 
contracts. 
A. A Fundamental (or at least, a sacrosanct) Right 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hodel v. Irving stated 
that the “right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—has 
been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”69 
Further, the United States, a party to the action, conceded that “the total 
abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely 
unconstitutional.”70 Traditionally, the support for this right as sacrosanct 
includes the following rationales: (1) the right to transfer property at 
death is natural law; (2) it encourages wealth accumulation and 
discourages waste; (3) it produces happiness by strengthening families; 
and (4) it is the most administratively efficient means to dispose of 
property at death.71 On the other hand, some commentators have 
questioned whether the right to transfer property at death is fundamental 
by arguing that Hodel applies mainly to state regulations that effect a 
taking of property.72 In other words, as long as a state does not abrogate 
67 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1991) 
(enforcing cruise liner’s contract of adhesion, and specifically, forum selection 
clause as reasonable because the cruise liner could make potential litigation 
more predictable, thus, less costly, reducing costs for future consumers). 
68 See Horton, supra note 5, at 597–600.  
69 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716; see also In re Estate of Felhofer, 843 N.W.2d 57, 66 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming that Wisconsin recognizes the right to transfer 
property at death as a fundamental right).  
70 Id.   
71 Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the 
Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 85 (2015).  
72 Ronald Chester, Essay: Is the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?--The 
Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. UNIV. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1995).  
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the entire inheritance of an individual, a regulation should be upheld as 
constitutional.73  
Regardless of whether the right is fundamental, most 
commentators cannot deny the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that 
the right to transfer at death is “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”74 In turn, 
several scholars have relied on Hodel in arguing for the inheritability of 
digital assets.75 One commentator in particular draws upon the authority 
of Hodel to propose that consumers should have a choice as to whether 
their digital assets are transferable at death.76 
B. Wills Overriding Contracts Outside the Digital Context 
Given the sacrosanct nature of the right to dispose of assets at 
death, many courts have held that provisions in a will override 
contractual provisions under certain circumstances.77 For example, in 
most jurisdictions, testators may override a beneficiary designation in a 
life insurance contract by designating another beneficiary of the policy by 
will so long as the testator attempted to change the beneficiary using the 
protocol described in the policy agreement but failed to complete the 
73 Id. at 1211–12. 
74 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716.     
75 Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or 
Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 801 (2014) (The right 
to devise is one of the most significant property rights in American law.”). 
Specifically, Banta argued that:  
Americans expect to have decision-making control over how 
their belongings are distributed at their death, and until 
recently, contracts have regularly been used to effectuate the 
intention of a decedent. But this expectation is coming into 
stark conflict with emerging contracts, most clearly 
demonstrated by contracts governing digital assets. 
Id. at 801.  
76 Tyler G. Tarney, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at 
Death, 40 CAP. L. REV. 773, 800 (2012).  
77 See, e.g., Estate of Trigoboff, 669 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) 
(holding that a will overrides terms of beneficiary designation of an IRA when 
the will specifically bequeaths IRA to beneficiary). 
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change due to unforeseen circumstances.78 On the other hand, some 
jurisdictions hold that if the life insurance policy designates a manner for 
changing a beneficiary, an insured can only effectuate a change in a 
beneficiary designation by following the procedure under the policy’s 
terms.79  
For example, the decedent in Cook handwrote a will stating, “[I] 
leave my Worldly posessions (sic) to my Wife and son, [including] my 
Insurance policys (sic),”80 but the decedent’s life insurance policy 
78 See, e.g., Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U. S., 428 N.E.2d 110, 
115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that decedent could not change the 
beneficiary because the decedent did not attempt to follow the procedures of 
the policy); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 191 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1946) (holding that the plaintiff’s intention to change the life insurance 
beneficiary is insufficient when not complying with the mode of changing a 
beneficiary by the life insurance policy).  
79 See, e.g., Cook, 428 N.E.2d at 115.  
80 Id. at 112. The relevant portions of the decedent’s will are as follows:  
 
Last Will & Testimint [sic] 
 
I Douglas D. Cook 
 
Being of sound mind do Hereby leave all my 
Worldly posessions [sic] to my Wife and son, 
Margaret A. Cook & Daniel Joseph Cook. 
being my Bank Accounts at Irwin Union 
Bank & trust to their Welfair [sic] my 
Insurance policys [sic] with Common Welth 
of Ky. and Equitable Life. all my machinecal 
[sic] tools to be left to my son if He is 
Interested in Working with them If not to be 
sold and money used for their welfair [sic] all 
my Gun Collection Kept as long as they, my 
Wife & Son [sic] and then sold and money 
used for their welfair [sic].  
 
I sign [sic] this 
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required that a beneficiary change is effective only upon written notice to 
the life insurance company and approval by the company.81 The Indiana 
Court of Appeals held that the transfer of the decedent’s policy by will 
did not override the beneficiary designation in the decedent’s life 
insurance policy because all the parties to the policy—the insured, the 
insurer, and the beneficiary—should be able to rely on the contract with 
certainty.82 The court emphasized that if the decision were otherwise, 
insurance companies would struggle to administer the proceeds of the 
life insurance policy because insureds could change a beneficiary of a 
policy without giving notice to the insurer of the change.83 For example, 
the insurer would claim that the beneficiary is one individual while the 
executor may claim that the beneficiary is another, resulting in a 
dispute.84 
Id.  
81 Id. at 111. The relevant provision of the decedent’s life insurance policy is as 
follows:  
BENEFICIARY. The Owner may change the 
beneficiary from time to time prior to the 
death of the Insured, by written notice to the 
Society, but any such change shall be effective 
only if it is endorsed on this policy by the 
Society, and, if there is a written assignment 
of this policy in force and on file with the 
Society (other than an assignment to the 
Society as security for an advance), such a 
change may be made only with the written 
consent of the assignee.  
Id.  
82 Id. at 116.  
83 Id. at 115 (“Clearly it is in the interest of insurance companies to require and 
to follow certain specified procedures in the change of beneficiaries of its 
policies so that they may pay over benefits to persons properly entitled to them 
without subjection to claims by others of whose rights they had no notice or 
knowledge.”). 
84 Id. (contending that “Certainly it is also in the interest of beneficiaries 
themselves to be entitled to prompt payment of benefits by insurance 
companies which do not withhold payment until the will has been probated in 
the fear of later litigation which might result from having paid the wrong 
party.”). 
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Evidently, a legal precedent exists for wills and other 
testamentary instruments overriding contracts.85 
IV. INHERITABILITY OF DIGITAL ASSETS 
For digital assets, the issue is whether digital assets are 
inheritable—more specifically, whether an individual has rights in the 
digital asset similar to that of traditional property rights and 
characteristics.86 As a threshold consideration, a clear definition of a 
digital asset is necessary to determine the rights in a digital asset.87 
Without a clear definition of the property rights in a digital asset, online 
service providers have more control over digital assets if their TOS 
agreements are enforceable.88  
A. Lack of Clarity—The Development of a Definition for Digital Assets 
1. General Definitions 
Black’s Law Dictionary does not define digital asset,89 which may 
be because the definition of a digital asset is still a legal question.90 For 
the purposes of estate planning, one of the broader definitions includes:  
“[A]ny file on your computer in a storage 
drive or website and any online account 
or membership.” Under this definition, 
digital assets include Microsoft Office 
documents, digital photos, music on 
iTunes, as well as online memberships 
such as e-mail accounts, profiles on 
social-networking sites, online banking 
85 See supra Part III, Section B and accompanying notes.  
86 See infra Part IV, Section A(ii) and accompanying notes.  
87 See Horton, supra note 5, 567–68. 
88 See id. 
89 See Asset, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
90 Eichler, supra note 14, at 211–12.  
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and credit card accounts, and website or 
domain names owned by a person. 91  
A narrower definition includes emails, documents, audio and video files, 
and images stored on desktop devices, computers, tablets, or mobile 
devices.92 One commentator stated that a digital estate may include the 
following: “videos, text documents, photographs, music, emails, online 
subscriptions, cell phone applications, video games, online personal 
social media accounts, and other similar items.”93  
In comparison, the RUFADAA has a broad, inclusive definition 
of a digital asset with regard to accessing a digital asset;94 however, the 
RUFADAA’s definition of a digital asset for inheritability is limited to a 
decedent’s rights as defined by state law, which under a TOS agreement 
would entail the right to a non-transferable license (i.e., noninheritable 
asset).95 Specifically, the RUFADAA defines a digital asset as “an 
electronic record in which an individual has a right or interest[,]” which 
“does not include an underlying asset or liability unless the asset or 
liability is itself an electronic record[.]”96  
Given the lack of clarity in defining a digital asset and the 
insufficiency of the RUFADAA’s definition for inheritability, state 
legislatures must reevaluate the definition of a digital asset under this 
91 Matthew D. Glennon, A Call to Action: Why the Connecticut Legislature Should 
Solve the Digital Asset Dilemma, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 48, 53 (2011); see also 
Jamie P. Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209, 211 (2014) (“Essentially, digital assets include any 
electronically stored information.”).  
92 Glennon, supra note 91, at 53. 
93 Jaime Patrick Hopkins & Ilya Alexander Lipin, Viable Solutions to the Digital 
Estate Planning Dilemma, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 64 (2013).  
94 See 2014 ISSUES MEMO 2, supra note 13, at 2 (“It governs only access to 
digital assets. It defers to other law to determine the ownership of the assets.”). 
95 See id. (providing that fiduciaries “step into the shoes of” the decedent). 
96 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 2(10) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2015_ 
RUFADAA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf. The definition of a digital asset 
“includes any type of electronically-stored information, such as: 1) information 
stored on a user’s computer and other digital devices; 2) content uploaded onto 
websites; and 3) rights in digital property.” Id. at § 2 cmt. at 6.  
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proposal. As demonstrated below, some scholars have already touched 
upon this issue and may offer some guidelines for reevaluating the 
definition.   
2. Comparing Digital Assets to Traditional Assets 
For the purpose of inheritability, scholars define a digital asset 
based on whether it has the traditional components of a tangible asset: 
namely, whether the digital asset is an asset instead of a service, and 
whether that asset has actual value. First, some commentators draw the 
distinction between an asset and a service.97 Simply put, these 
commentators distinguish ownership based on online content versus an 
online account.98 Specifically, an online platform is a service, while 
individual’s contents on that platform may be an inheritable asset.99 For 
example, if Adam leaves control of his social media accounts to Bailey 
via his will, Bailey cannot use his Facebook account under this definition, 
but she can retrieve copies of her father’s photographs, communications, 
and other information on his account.100  
For a comparison of this test to traditional assets, Black’s Law 
Dictionary provides the following definition for a service:  
Labor performed in the interest or under 
the direction of others; specif[ically], the 
performance of some useful act or series 
of acts for the benefit of another, usu[ally] 
for a fee . . . . In this sense, service 
denotes an intangible commodity in the 
form of human effort, such as labor, skill, 
or advice.101 
97 Michael D. Roy, Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online Services 
Revolutionize Estate Planning?, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 376, 384 (2011). 
98 Id. at 384–86.  
99 Id. at 384.  
100 Id. at 386–87.  
101 Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  
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Notably, services are distinguishable from assets in that services 
are intangible, and thus, a service cannot exist in a tangible medium.102 A 
service contract, likewise, is canceled upon the death of a party—it is not 
inheritable.103 However, given the somewhat ethereal nature of digital 
assets, determining whether a digital asset is intangible or tangible may be 
troublesome. For instance, a digital copy of a song can exist on a disc, 
but a social media platform cannot exist as a tangible counterpart. 
Furthermore, a collection of television shows can exist in the form of a 
subscription to an online television provider (i.e., a service) or in the 
form of a disc collection (i.e., an asset).  
Secondly, some commentators have argued that rights in a digital 
asset should be determined  based on whether an online account has 
“purely sentimental value” or “actual monetary value.”104 From here, one 
must determine whether the beneficiary of a digital asset is entitled to 
continued use of the account or just merely access to the account to 
derive the value in it—the “asset-versus-service” test.105 For example, 
Adam’s Facebook profile may have sentimental value, but his 
photographs may be the only content that have monetary value. 
Therefore, Bailey would be entitled to download the photographs from 
her father’s Facebook account but would not have the power to use the 
profile as her own.   
Even though there is an appeal in defining digital assets in the 
context of traditional property rights, TOS agreements still are the main 
authority governing an individual’s rights to transfer property at death.106  
B. Enforceability of TOS Agreements 
Ultimately, the question of inheritability turns on whether an 
individual has property rights in the asset after death.107 In other words, 
the question is whether an individual owns the asset as defined by 
102 See id.  
103 Roy, supra note 97, at 384.  
104 Sherry, supra note 16, at 210; see also Hopkins & Lipin, supra note 93, at 64 
(emphasizing digital assets that have been more traditionally valued, such as 
customer lists).  
105 Sherry, supra note 16, at 210.  
106 See infra Part IV, section B and accompanying notes.  
107 Horton, supra note 5, at 567.  
                                                     
2017]                                             Is Access Enough?                                             1051 
contract.108 Some commentators argue that online service providers 
circumvent inheritability by designating in the contract that an individual 
does not own a digital asset; therefore, the individual cannot dispose of 
the asset at death.109 For example, if Adam owns one-hundred thousand 
frequent-flier miles and the contract states that these miles “do not 
constitute property,”110 then Adam cannot give these airline miles to 
Bailey upon his death.111  
Evidently, the terms of the contract determine an individual’s 
property rights in the digital asset,112 and each of these contracts are 
construed under state law.113 Thus, each state’s enforceability of a TOS 
agreement would determine whether a digital asset can pass through 
probate via a will.114 Enforceability of a TOS agreement has traditionally 
been centered on whether the agreement is procedurally or substantively 
unconscionable.115 In other words, enforceability of TOS agreements 
revolve around whether the agreement is a contract of adhesion and 
contains unfair terms to the purchaser. 
In addressing procedural unconscionability, it is necessary to 
review the two general forms of TOS agreements: (1) clickwrap 
agreements and (2) browsewrap agreements. Clickwrap agreements are 
typically enforceable because they require the user to scroll through the 
108 Id. at 568.  
109 Glennon, supra note 91, at 57.  
110 Terms and Conditions, AMERICAN AIRLINES, https://www.aa.com/i18n 
/aadvantage-program/terms-and-conditions.jsp (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).  
111 See also Horton, supra note 5, at 565–67 (stating the proposition that a 
provision stating that frequent flier miles are not property circumvents any 
inheritability).  
112 Roy, supra note 97, at 384.  
113 See id. 
114 See Banta, supra note 75, at 831 (“Contracts that attempt to bypass these state 
laws are illegal and against public policy favoring the freedom of disposition.”).  
115 See David Horton, Contractual Indescendibility, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1068–
71 (2015).  
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terms and agree to them before using the website’s services.116 
Browsewrap agreements, on the other hand, are typically unenforceable 
because the terms are either inconspicuously placed on a webpage or 
require opening a hyperlink to access.117 
The “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” names come from earlier 
form of contracts—namely, “shrinkwrap” agreements, which typically 
came in a package delivered to the consumer’s doorstep.118 Courts held 
that shrinkwrap agreements are enforceable and, based on that 
precedent, held that clickwrap agreements are likewise enforceable.119 
Specifically, the rationale for enforcing shrinkwrap agreements is that 
“when the purchaser receives [his or her product], sees the license 
agreement [in the package], and does not return [the product],” there is 
116 Alison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, From the Chair: “Click Here to Accept the 
Terms of Service”, 31 COMMC’NS LAWYER 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n), Jan. 2015, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/communications_lawyer/2015/janu
ary/click_% 
20here.html. 
117 See e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002). 
118 Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 829 n.3 (Okla. 2005). 
119 i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 
(D. Mass. 2002). Specifically, the court stated the following:  
If ProCD was correct to enforce a shrinkwrap 
license agreement, where any assent is 
implicit, then it must also be correct to 
enforce a clickwrap license agreement, where 
the assent is explicit. To be sure, shrinkwrap 
and clickwrap license agreements share the 
defect of any standardized contract—they are 
susceptible to the inclusion of terms that 
border on the unconscionable—but that is 
not the issue in this case. The only issue 
before the Court is whether clickwrap license 
agreements are an appropriate way to form 
contracts, and the Court holds they are. In 
short, i.LAN explicitly accepted the clickwrap 
license agreement when it clicked on the box 
stating “I agree.” 
Id.  
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mutual assent to the agreement.120 Courts described this as “money now, 
terms later.”121 In the context of a digital asset, the court in i.Lan Systems, 
Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp. admitted that these agreements may be 
susceptible to unconscionable provisions, but like “money now, terms 
later,” clicking “I agree” is sufficient for mutual assent to the terms and 
conditions.122 
In 2002, Sonia Sotamayor, then writing for the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, distinguished a browsewrap agreement from a 
clickwrap agreement in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.123 
Specifically, the Second Circuit held that an inconspicuous reference to 
the terms and conditions of a license agreement is insufficient to 
constitute mutual asset.124 In fact, the court noted that Netscape, a free-
service, hid the acceptance of the terms and conditions of the license 
agreement.125 Therefore, regardless of the general rule of not allowing a 
party to avoid a contract by not reading its terms,126 a user is not 
expected to search for the terms and conditions when using a free 
service because this transaction does not compare to “the paper world of 
arm’s-length bargaining.”127 
Recently, Berkson v. Gogo LLC illustrated the more prevalent form 
of a click-wrap agreement: a scrollwrap agreement, which allows the user 
to scroll through the terms and conditions before clicking to accept.128 
Affirming that scrollwrap agreements are generally enforceable, the 
Berkson court synthesized the following principles for assenting to TOS 
agreements: (1) “[TOS agreements] will not be enforced when there is no 
120 Id.  
121 Id.   
122 Id.   
123 Specht, 306 F.3d at 32.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 35. 
126 Id. at 30.  
127 Id. at 32.  
128 Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 398 (E.D. N.Y. 2015). 
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evidence that the [user] had notice of the agreement”; (2) “[TOS 
agreements] will be enforced when a user is encouraged by the 
design . . . of the website . . . to examine the terms . . . through 
hyper[links]”; and (3) “[TOS agreements] will not be enforced 
where . . . terms [are] buried at the bottom of a webpage or tucked 
away.”129 
Thus, TOS agreements are generally enforceable contracts of 
adhesion if the parties have constructive notice of the terms and make an 
affirmative act to agree to them—by clicking “I agree.”130 Conversely, 
TOS agreements are generally unenforceable contracts of adhesion if the 
terms are inconspicuous given that a user must click a hyperlink to view 
the terms and does not have to view these terms to use the service.131 
From a policy perspective, TOS agreements generally survive a challenge 
based on a contract of adhesion because standardized form contracts 
reduce administrative costs for online service providers.132 Specifically, 
allowing individuals to transfer assets at death, absent a uniform 
restriction of the use of digital assets, would dramatically increase the 
costs to online service providers in managing user accounts because the 
providers would have to manage each transfer on an case by case 
basis.133 
Furthermore, for substantive unconscionability, the issue with 
TOS agreements goes beyond mutual assent, and courts must determine 
if the terms are unfair to one party.134 For example, in Feldman v. Google, 
the plaintiff challenged Google’s Adwords agreement that provided: 
“Carefully read the following terms and conditions. If you agree with 
these terms, indicate your assent below.”135 At the bottom of the page, 
the agreement read, “Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions,” 
129 Id. at 401–02.  
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 402; see also Horton, supra note 5, at 547 (contending that “barring 
posthumous transfer can prevent . . . ‘administrability’ problems.”). 
133 See Horton, supra note 5, at 585–600.  
134 See Horton, supra note 115, at 1069–71.  
135 Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  
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which was above the box that the advertiser could click.136 Accordingly, 
the agreement gave sufficient notice to the plaintiff, but the forum 
selection clause provided that disputes would take place in California 
where Google was located.137 Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the 
Adwords agreement was not only procedurally unconscionable as a 
contract of adhesion but also substantively unconscionable because the 
forum selection clause unreasonably favored the sophisticated party, 
Google.138 The court rejected both arguments by construing this contract 
as a valid and enforceable contract of adhesion and forum selection 
clause outside the digital context.139 In contrast, the Berkson court held 
that a TOS agreement was unenforceable because the forum selection 
clause would “materially alter the substantive default rights [of] ordinary 
consumers who are unlikely to be aware of them.”140 
Despite the general enforceability of TOS agreements, many 
scholars are still skeptical of these agreements given that they are lengthy 
contracts of adhesion that are rarely read.141 Furthermore, commentators 
have advocated for making TOS agreements unenforceable because the 
excessive length discourages individuals from reading these 
agreements.142 In fact, recent statistics have indicated that users rarely 
read these agreements, affirming the common knowledge notion that not 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 242–43. 
138 Id. at 243.  
139 Id. at 240–43.  
140 Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 404 (E.D. N.Y. 2015). 
141 See, e.g., Eichler, supra note 14, at 215–16 (arguing that TOS agreements are 
unconscionable and keep consumers from transferring what they think they 
own at death); Horton, supra note 5, at 1068–69 (contending that consumers 
can claim that TOS agreements are unconscionable due to lack of mutual assent 
and unfair terms).  
142 Sherry, supra note 16, at 204.  
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many users read before they click.143 Accordingly, mutual assent is not 
apparent in lengthy contracts of adhesion that are rarely read.  
Coupled with the disincentive to read a TOS agreement are 
provisions that unfairly surprise consumers, such as having a non-
transferable license.144 For example, in Ajemian v. Yahoo, the executors of 
the deceased’s estate brought a declaratory judgment action to declare 
that the deceased’s electronic messages from his Yahoo! email account 
were property of the estate.145 The original TOS agreement that the 
decedent agreed to contained no provision discussing non-transferability 
at death; however, Yahoo! updated its TOS to include such provision 
but did not notify its users.146 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals held 
that the TOS was unenforceable because the decedent did not assent to 
the terms, considering that Yahoo! did not establish that the change in 
the TOS agreement was prominently displayed to the decedent to 
provide him notice of the change.147 
Most notably, Natalie Banta has argued that TOS agreements are 
undermining succession law and keeping a new class of property, digital 
assets, from being inheritable.148 However, she also argued that private 
contracts, not wills, are the most efficient manner to transfer property at 
death.149 Simply put, individuals could transfer digital assets at death 
under a private agreement between the online service provider and 
user.150  
143 See STUDY ON CONSUMERS’ ATTITUDES, supra note 2, at 96–97. In a recent 
study, only nine percent of users read the TOS agreement when having to open 
the agreement to view the terms. Only twenty-two percent of users read the 
TOS agreement when forced to scroll through the terms. See id.  
144 See Eichler, supra note 14, at 211 (“[TOS] agreement[s] lead[] to an 
unconscionable result that robs people of property rights that they likely (and 
reasonably) believed they had.”).  
145 Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Mass. Ct. App. 2013).  
146 Id. at 607–08.  
147 See id. at 611–12.  
148 Banta, supra note 75, at 853.  
149 Id. at 845-46.  
150 Id. at 853. 
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V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: APPLYING THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM 
FOR INHERITABILITY 
To protect consumers’ rights to transfer digital assets at death, 
state legislatures should adopt the RUFADAA’s three-tier system for the 
purpose of inheritability.151 As a result, consumers would have the 
opportunity to designate a beneficiary of a digital asset using an online 
tool agreement.152 Alternatively, a consumer may designate a beneficiary 
for a digital asset via a will or other testamentary instrument, overriding 
any contrary provision in a TOS agreement.153 Because this proposal 
allows for the transfer of digital assets at death and provides that a 
beneficiary designation may be made under a private agreement between 
the online service provider and consumer, adopting this proposal would 
balance the right to dispose of property at death and the right to contract 
while also protecting consumers from unknowingly purchasing a digital 
asset subject to a non-transferable license.  
A. Balance Between the Right to Transfer Property at Death and the Right to 
Contract 
State legislatures should adopt the RUFADAA’s three-tier 
system for the purpose of inheritability of digital assets.154 After all, this 
system would give a private contract between the online service provider 
and decedent (i.e., an online tool) priority for the disposition of a digital 
asset at death.155 In other words, an individual would be able to transfer a 
digital asset at death outside of probate via a contract with the online 
service provider.156 If there is no online tool agreement offered or,if the 
151 See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.  
152 See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.  
153 See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.  
154 See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes.  
155 See REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4(a) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2015_ 
RUFADAA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf. 
156 See Banta, supra note 75, 845–48.  
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individual does not agree to an online tool agreement, an individual may 
designate a beneficiary by will or other testamentary instrument.157 
Without a designation made in either an online tool agreement or will, 
the TOS agreement governs the right to transfer at death.158 
To accomplish the inheritability of digital assets at death, a 
revision of the language of the RUFADAA may look like the following:  
(a) A user may use an online tool to direct 
the custodian to transfer to a designated 
recipient or not to disclose some or all of 
the user’s digital assets, . . . [A] transfer 
using an online tool overrides a contrary 
direction by the user in a will, trust, power 
of attorney, or other dispositive or 
nominative instrument. 
(b) If a user has not used an online tool to 
give direction under subsection or if the 
custodian has not provided an online 
tool, the user may allow or prohibit in a 
will, trust, power of attorney, or other 
record, to transfer some or all of the 
user's digital assets.  
(c) A user's direction under subsection (a) 
or (b) overrides a contrary provision in a 
terms-of-service agreement that does not 
require the user to act affirmatively and 
distinctly from the user's assent to the 
terms of service.159 
With this proposal, state legislatures would prioritize the right to transfer 
at death, either by contract or will, over enforcing TOS agreements that 
are lengthy contracts of adhesion. At the same time, this proposal would 
offer more protection to consumers by fulfilling the common belief that 
157 See REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4(b). 
158 See id. at § 4(c).  
159 Id. at § 4(a)–(c).  
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purchasing a digital asset gives the individual more property rights in the 
asset than a non-transferable license.160 For example, if Adam 
unknowingly purchased a non-transferable license of an iTunes 
collection under Apple’s standard TOS agreement, then Adam would 
have two options to designate Bailey as his beneficiary: (1) Adam could 
designate Bailey as his beneficiary using Apple’s online tool agreement, 
or (2) Adam could give Bailey his song collection through his will.   
Unlike many commentator’s arguments to make TOS 
agreements unenforceable,161 this proposed legislation only prioritizes 
the designation of a beneficiary by will over a TOS agreement; it does 
not invalidate the TOS agreement. For instance, if Adam died without 
either making a will or designating a beneficiary using an online tool, 
Bailey would not inherit Adam’s music collection under the terms of the 
still enforceable TOS agreement. After all, TOS agreements should not 
generally be deemed unenforceable because these agreements lower costs 
for online service providers and allow them to operate more freely using 
standardized forms. Accordingly, this proposal, like the RUFADAA, 
does not give an implicit authority of the decedent to transfer property. 
Instead, it gives priority to a testator’s explicit instructions at death.  
Furthermore, to promote more administrability for online service 
providers, this proposed legislation would require written notice to the 
service provider upon the designation of a beneficiary by will. For 
instance, a testator generally needs to give written notice to an insurance 
company when overriding a beneficiary designation in his or her policy 
by will.162 After all, requiring notice prevents the insurance company 
from expending more administrative costs when informed of a 
beneficiary change after the insured’s death.163 Similarly, if an owner of a 
digital asset designates a beneficiary of a digital asset by will, the owner 
under this proposal would be required to give written notice to the 
160 See Horton, supra note 5, at 548.  
161 See Eichler, supra note 14, at 215. 
162 See Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U. S., 428 N.E.2d 110, 115 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981).  
163 See id.; see also Horton, supra note 5, at 547. 
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online service provider of such change. Overall, informing the online 
service provider would prevent subsequent disputes and allow for the 
companies to easily designate a particular individual as succeeding to a 
digital asset.  
B. Limitations on Proposed Legislation 
1. Transfers At Death 
First, this proposed legislation would only address the right to 
transfer an asset upon death, not during life. If a digital asset was 
transferable inter vivos, consumers may transfer use of an asset while 
retaining a copy (or recopying) during life.164 Therefore, this proposal 
does not implicate an issue with recopying a digital asset for the use of 
another;165 rather, a beneficiary of a digital asset need only access a 
decedent’s online account and have the right to use that account. For 
example, Bailey would only need her father’s Apple username and 
password to succeed to Adam’s collection of music. Because Adam is 
deceased, Apple would presumably be less concerned with him retaining 
copies of his music.  
2. Limited by the Definition of a Digital Asset 
The main purpose of this proposal is to confirm the beliefs of 
consumers—that they actually own a digital asset. Because of this 
purpose, the definition of a digital asset under this proposal is limited to 
digital assets that have a tangible counterpart or characteristics.166 For 
example, a song may exist in the form of an mp3 or a disc; thus, this 
legislation would cover an mp3 song. In contrast, this legislation would 
not cover the use of an online platform, such as Facebook, Netflix, etc., 
but would entitle individuals to transfer their own content from these 
platforms, such as photographs.167 Thus, this proposal seeks to give 
164 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654–55 (S.D. 
N.Y. 2013).  
165 See id. 
166 See Roy, supra note 97, at 384; Sherry, supra note 16, at 210; see also Hopkins 
& Lipin, supra note 93, at 64 (emphasizing digital assets that have been more 
traditionally valued, such as customer lists). 
167 See supra Part IV, section A (ii).  
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digital assets the same rights as their counterparts in a tangible, or 
traditional, form. Given the lack of clarity for the definition of a digital 
asset,168 this proposal will not go further. 
3. Does Not Solve the Whole Problem: Expansion of the First Sale 
Doctrine to Digital Assets 
An objection to this proposal would be that it conflicts with the 
distribution right under copyright law.169 Anthony Eichler has correctly 
argued that the first sale doctrine needs to be expanded to allow licensed, 
digital assets to be transferred at death because state law cannot override 
federal copyright law.170 Otherwise, if digital assets are transferred, even 
if allowed under state law, the copyright owner would have a cause of 
action for copyright infringement.171 
While Eichler’s argument is sound, he dismissed state law 
reforms too quickly because state contract law may prevent inheritability 
even if the first sale doctrine is expanded to include digital assets. After 
all, federal copyright law does not preempt state law governing 
contractual rights between parties.172 In other words, the expansion of 
the first sale doctrine would not prevent an online service provider from 
licensing a digital asset; it would only prevent them from having a 
copyright action against the purchaser who transferred it.173 Therefore, 
even if copyright law allows the transfer of a digital asset, the online 
service provider’s TOS agreement would prevent the inheritability of a 
digital asset if it only grants a non-transferable license. Although the first 
sale doctrine must be expanded to provide that a copyright claim does 
not result from the disposition of digital assets at death, states must also 
168 See supra Part IV, section A and accompanying notes.  
169 See generally Eichler, supra note 14, at 210.  
170 Id.  at 226–28; see supra Part II, Section D and accompanying notes.  
171 Eichler, supra note 14, at 223–28. 
172 See e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).  
173 See Sherry, supra note 16, at 204.  
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prevent online service providers from having a contract cause of action 
for breaching their license agreements.174  
Taken together, if Congress expands the first sale doctrine to 
include digital assets and individuals are allowed to designate 
beneficiaries by an online tool or will under state law, beneficiaries of the 
deceased purchaser’s estate may inherit digital assets.  
C. Foreseeable Consequences to Online Service Providers 
As a practical matter, purchasers may forego any online tool 
agreement if they believe the terms are unfavorable.175 Accordingly, 
purchasers would designate a beneficiary by will, overriding a TOS 
agreement.176 For example, if Adam read the legacy contract of iTunes 
that provides “all mp3 files will go to the named beneficiary under this 
agreement,” but Adam wants to leave half his music to Bailey and half 
his music to Charlie, his brother, Adam could designate this transfer by 
will, which would override the non-transferable license that is the TOS 
agreement.  
Consequently, online service providers would likely curb the 
formal requirement for a separate agreement by providing an option to 
rent or purchase the digital asset from the outset. After all, the purpose 
of an online tool agreement is to provide the online service provider and 
the consumer an opportunity to designate a beneficiary of a digital asset 
by agreement. An option to rent or buy is appealing because it would 
satisfy the purpose of an online tool and would possibly be less costly to 
the provider. Accordingly, if these transactions result from the adoption 
of this proposal, then state legislatures or courts would probably 
characterize these transactions as online tool agreements.  
174 Contra Eichler, supra note 14, at 220–21 (arguing that federal copyright law 
preempts state reform for inheritability).  
175 See REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4(b) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2015_ 
RUFADAA_Final%20Act_2016mar8.pdf. (providing that if a user does not use 
an online tool agreement, a user may make the designation using a will).  
176 See id.  
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From there, online service providers would adjust the price of a 
digital asset to account for the transfer of the asset at death because 
consumers prefer the benefits of inheritability over a license.177 
Consequently, if the original price of a digital asset (i.e., the license) is 
similar to the tangible form of that asset, then online providers may have 
to discount the price of a licensed digital asset because of its restricted 
use.  
For example, Amazon currently prices the Red Hot Chili 
Peppers (“Chili Peppers”) new album, The Getaway, at $11.88 for a CD 
version of the album, but an mp3 version of the album costs $11.49.178 
Furthermore, the disc album includes a free mp3 version of the album, 
so the nominally higher price for the tangible version does not seem to 
reflect the limited use of its digital version.179 In comparison, Amazon 
prices the Chili Peppers Greatest Hits album at $9.99 for the disc, but at 
$12.49 for the mp3 version.180 Given the similarity between prices of 
many assets in digital form to their tangible counterparts,181 online 
service providers may discount digital assets to reflect the restricted use 
of the asset under a non-transferable, license agreement. As a result, 
Adam would have the option to purchase The Getaway with the power to 
designate Bailey as the beneficiary of the album upon his death or rent 
itat a lower price.  
177 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ProCD 
offers software and data for two prices: one for personal use, a higher price for 
commercial use. Zeidenberg wants to use the data without paying the seller's 
price[.]”).  
178 The Getaway, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Getaway-Red-Hot-Chili 
Peppers/dp/B01F3REDMU/ref=ntt_m.us_dp_dpt_1 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2016).  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Compare iTunes Preview, APPLE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/album 
/confessions/id386153476 (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (pricing Usher’s 
Confessions mp3 album at $10.99), with BEST BUY, http://www.bestbuy.com 
/site/confessions-special-edition-cd/6845088.p?sku Id=6845088 (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2016) (pricing Usher’s Confessions CD album at $5.99).  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The RUFADAA dispelled with the issue of access to digital 
assets, but it did not address the more pertinent issue: inheritability. With 
the growth of the digital ownership, there is an increased need to 
promote the inheritability of digital assets. Put simply, as digital 
ownership becomes more of the norm, there is an increased need to treat 
digital assets as their tangible counterparts. Currently, online service 
providers prevent consumers from designating a beneficiary to inherit a 
digital asset under TOS agreements. Although there is a general 
skepticism of TOS agreements as enforceable, online service providers 
need these types of agreements to lower administrative costs. Therefore, 
to accomplish inheritability, this proposal balances the right to transfer 
property at death with the right to contract, prioritizing separate 
agreements and testamentary instruments over TOS agreements. 
Specifically, state legislatures should allow online service providers to 
contract with a consumer to designate a beneficiary for their digital 
assets. Otherwise, individuals may designate a beneficiary under their 
will, which would override any contrary provision in a TOS agreement.  
The greatest impediment to this proposal is that the first sale 
doctrine does not apply to digital assets. Consequently, if a state 
legislature adopted this proposal, a transfer of a digital asset would result 
in a copyright infringement. However, this proposal would complement 
any expansion of the first sale doctrine because it would prevent online 
service providers from still licensing digital assets under state law.  
Ultimately, state legislatures should reevaluate the law governing 
digital assets with consumer protection in mind since many individuals 
unknowingly purchase a non-transferable license in a digital asset. The 
adoption of this proposal would help bring estate planning into the 
twenty-first century by providing a precedent for treating digital assets 
with traditional property rights in an increasingly digital world.  
